Aircraft components manufacturer

 

Two Buildings on this manufacturing site were involved in this fire. The three-floor building where the blaze originated was of metal-framed and brick in-fill construction, with asbestos cement sheets covering the roof and one-third of the walls. An adjacent building, which featured a slated roof on wooden trusses with a concrete floor, was also damaged.

The fire was discovered at 1.49pm and a number of telephone calls were made to the local fire brigade. No attempts were made to fight the blaze until the brigade arrived at 1.52pm.

Two appliances were initially mobilised from the local station. However, after crews arrived at the scene, the number of pumping appliances was increased to four. Fire crews also called for a ladder platform to be made available, as the fire was spreading rapidly to the roof of the adjacent building.

By 2.35pm, six appliances were being used at the site. Three main jets and eight fire fighters wearing breathing apparatus were used to bring the blaze under control and prevent further fire spread. The fire was fully under control by 5.39pm.

The first floor of the building where the fire originated, which was of wooden construction, was severely damaged during the incident. The fire also destroyed the entire roof area of the adjacent building, which housed a paint spray shop.

The fire brigade investigation into the incident revealed that the fire was caused by severe burning from an overheated tank situated on the building’s first floor. The tank – which featured heating elements – was used to heat the chemical solvent trichloroethlyene and to degrease aircraft components before they were sprayed.

Several members of staff questioned by fire investigators said they had informed management that a burning smell coming from the area around the tank the week before the fire occurred. However, an engineer inspected the tank but found no problem. From this, the brigade investigators concluded that employees using the tank had left it switched on and allowed the trichloroethlyene inside to boil dry on several occasions prior to the incident. However, to operate the tank properly, employees should have switched it off and allowed it to cool for at least 30 minutes after use. Employees working on the day of the fire reported that the tank had not cooled down properly and may have been left switched on. From this the brigade concluded that the tank had boiled dry, resulting in radiated heat from the tank igniting the wooden floor onto which it was fitted. The intense heat of the burning area also caused a drum of trichloroethlyene to explode. The fire brigade found that no fire detection equipment was fitted in any of the areas affected by the fire.